The Race You Leave, the Door You Close
Thiel tells individuals to escape competition and tells companies to build what no one can escape. Can one person's exit be built as everyone else's cage?
Peter Thiel gives two pieces of advice that sound like one. To the person, he says: stop competing. In Zero to One he calls competition "an ideology" that "pervades our society and distorts our thinking," the habit of wanting what others want because they want it, and fighting harder and harder over less and less. Step out of the race and you might find something worth doing. To the company, he says: become the thing nobody can step out of. "All happy companies are different," he writes, rewriting Tolstoy; "all failed companies are the same: they failed to escape competition." In his 2014 Wall Street Journal essay, US airlines made about 37 cents per passenger trip in 2012 while Google kept about 21 percent of its revenue as profit. The airlines are trapped in a race. Google left it.
Read one way, these are the same teaching at two scales. Freedom means getting out of the crowd. A person does it by refusing borrowed ambitions; a company does it by building something no rival can copy. Both are escapes, and an escape is good.
Read the other way, the second piece of advice quietly reverses the first. A person who escapes competition leaves the race and harms nobody; the crowd simply loses one runner. A company that escapes competition does something different. Its customers, its suppliers and the people who work on its platform lose their alternatives. The founder's exit is real. It is built, very often, as a room where everyone else no longer has one. Escaping a race is freedom for the one who leaves it and a fence for everyone who has to buy from the winner.
Thiel's own list of what makes a durable monopoly helps here, because it splits cleanly in two. Proprietary technology, the first item, is escape by being different: the product is so much better that nobody wants to copy it, and nobody is forced to buy it. Network effects and economies of scale, two of the others, are not mainly about being different. They are about how hard it becomes to leave. Your friends are already there; the cheapest supplier is already the biggest one. They work less by standing apart from the crowd than by keeping it.
The serious defense of monopoly has little to do with founders deserving to be rich. Its claim is that only protected profits pay for work with a long horizon. Thiel argues exactly this: in a perfectly competitive market a firm is too busy surviving today to plan for anything later. The best evidence is not his but history's. AT&T's regulated monopoly paid for Bell Labs, and in 1947 the transistor came out of it. A fragmented market of small telephone companies, each fighting over its margins, would not have funded a lab full of physicists to play with semiconductors for years. If you want the next transistor, you may have to accept the next AT&T.
That argument moves me, and it changes what I think the question is. I no longer think monopoly profit is illegitimate in itself. But look at how the Bell Labs story ends. Under federal agreements that restricted AT&T to telecommunications, the company licensed the transistor to others on easy terms rather than hoarding it, and the device escaped into an industry AT&T did not own. The monopoly's greatest gift reached the world because a public authority forced a door open. Long-horizon profits were tolerated in exchange for exits being kept for everyone else.
That is the test I would apply to any founder who quotes Thiel. Escaping competition by making something unlike anything else is the individual's freedom scaled up, and it is legitimate. Escaping competition by making your users unable to leave is a different act wearing the same word. The first asks the world to choose you. The second arranges for the world to stop choosing. The second can still pay for great things, but then the freedom being claimed isn't the founder's alone to spend, and someone has to hold the keys to the doors.
Thiel's line about failed companies was meant as a warning to founders. Seen from the other side of the counter, it has a twin he did not write: captured customers are all alike, too.
— The Andes